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Abstract
This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple innitely repeated game with imperfect
public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian
process at moments in time of length . It shows that e¢ cient strongly symmetric perfect public
equilibrium payo¤s can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each
other at the highest frequency, i.e. ! 0. The approach proposed places distinct initial conditions
on the process, which depend on the unknown action prole simultaneously and privately decided
by the players at the beginning of each period of the game. The strong decreasing e¤ect on
the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the
associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. The
existence of a positive monotonic relation between payo¤s and monitoring intensity is also found.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the general repeated games theory it is common to assume that the period length
between each repetition of the stage game has length one. When the monitoring is perfect,
letting the discount factor  ! 1 either by making the players more patient (a decrease
in r) or by shrinking the period length between actions (a decrease in ) are equivalent
exercises. The former approach has been preferred to prove many folk theorems and to
show the existence of e¢ cient equilibria.
When monitoring is not perfect but public, by making players increasingly patient, Fuden-
berg, Levine and Maskin (1994) were able to prove a folk theorem under some informational
assumptions1. Incentives are sustained through transfers of value between the players. When
we turn our attention to strongly symmetric equilibria in problems with two-sided imperfect
public monitoring, the pairwise identiability assumptions typically fail, limiting to a great
extent the provision of incentives. Payo¤s are then bounded away from e¢ ciency, even when
r ! 0. Destruction of value through punishments is the only way to provide incentives.
The question was then; if by letting ! 0 we could obtain e¢ cient strongly symmetric
payo¤s. In their pioneer work in frequent monitoring, Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991),
in a setting where the public information arrival is modelled with a Poisson process, have
shown that di¤erent but ine¢ cient results arise depending on whether  ! 1 is due to r ! 0
or to ! 0. In the latter case, they found that equilibrium payo¤s above the static Nash,
but not e¢ cient, can be sustained when the jumps in the process represent "bad new", which
are more likely to occur when some player has deviated2.
Recent work by Sannikov (2007)3 and Faingold and Sannikov (2007) on repeated games
modeled directly in continuous time, has renewed the interest in frequent monitoring. The
latter work, in a part which is relevant here, reports a degeneracy of the set of strongly
symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SSPPE henceforth) payo¤s in a game where a known
1 Their stronger assumption is called pairwise identiability, which means that a deviation from a given
player impacts on the distribution of the public signals di¤erently than any deviation from any other
player.
2 In an innitesimal time interval, the absence of realizations of the Poisson process is innitely more
likely than the occurrence of a realization. For that reason, the same result does not extend when the
information arrivals represent "good news".
3 This paper presents a characterization of the set of PPE payo¤s using continuous time methods.
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normal type long-run player faces a sequence of short run players. By degeneracy they mean
that payo¤s outside the convex hull of the Nash equilibria payo¤s set cannot by sustained
in continuous time, where the noisy public information is modeled through a Brownian
process. Also, more in the spirit of the present paper, i.e. by studying the limit of the
discrete time games, Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007a)
report the same degeneracy result. These results came as surprising, since Brownian motion
is an innitesimal variation process and we would expect payo¤s at least above the static
Nash payo¤s.
This paper explores frequent monitoring in a partnership game with imperfect public
monitoring and discounting, along the lines of the work of Radner, Myerson and Maskin
(1986)4. It analyses the limit of the sequence of the discrete time games indexed by .
The public signal is the observed state of an arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM henceforth)
process, in intervals of length . The observation is compared against a previously chosen
threshold, based on this decision rule; players adjust their actions for the following period.
It focus on the value of the best SSPPE and shows that in the limit5 e¢ cient payo¤s can be
achieved, independently on how players discount the future and on the level of uncertainty.
Moreover, the value of the best SSPPE payo¤ improves monotonically when the monitoring
intensity increases. The characterization of the optimal decision rule for di¤erent values of
 is also novel.
The approach proposed places distinct initial conditions on the process, which depend on
the unknown action prole privately and simultaneously decided by the players at the be-
ginning of each period of the game. This modelling approach changes the results drastically.
This paper is the rst to show e¢ cient results when the time interval between observations
is taken to the limit without placing assumptions on the uncertainty parameter. The result
is possible because the information extracted from the public signals becomes increasingly
4 Other classical situations involving imperfect public monitoring about players actions are Green and Porter
(1984) and Porter (1983) where the market price is an imperfect signal of the quantities supplied by rms.
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for complete surveys of the problems
and methods used to solve games with imperfect public information.
5 By "in the limit" we mean the length of time interval ! 0, sometimes also referred to as the "highest
monitoring intensity" or "continuous monitoring". During the paper we frequently mention "an increase
in the monitoring intensity" or "an increase in the monitoring frequency"; they refer to a decrease in .
3
precise as to players actions, increasing the payo¤s monotonically6. As a consequence, the
expected immediate gains associated with a deviation from the equilibrium path become
less attractive, not only because the periods between the actions becomes shorter, but also
because the expected number of periods during which a deviator can enjoy these gains
decreases.
Before going through the methodology presented in this paper in more detail, and in
order to better integrate it within the existent contributions, we will review the modelling
approach employed in the papers that are more closely related, with the goal to access the
source of their results.
Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007a)7 studied extensively how monitoring intensity a¤ects the
equilibrium payo¤s of the repeated Cournot duopoly game. They report the impossibility
of achieving payo¤s higher than the static Nash payo¤s when the public information arrives
continuously and disturbed by a Brownian motion. Crucial for their results is the assumption
that the public signal observed by the players, at moments in time t = ; 2; :::, is the state
of an ABM price process divided by the length of the time interval . Such modelling
of the observed public signal becomes extremely noisy when observed at high frequency,
creating a degeneracy e¤ect on the payo¤s. The root of the problem lies in the fact that the
accumulated Brownian increments in a given time interval  are of a higher order than the
underlying time interval, making any inference about the drift of the process ine¢ cient in
the limit, but not exclusively so.
Fudenberg and Levine (2007)8 study a repeated game with a nite action space where a
long-run player of a known type faces a sequence of myopic short-run players. The public
6 These results share similarities with the ones obtained in Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991). For the
"bad news" case, the most e¢ cient equilibrium (however not fully e¢ cient) is obtained in the limit, and
there is also a monotonic improvement on the payo¤with the monitoring intensity. Here the most e¢ cient
result is also obtained in the limit; it is however fully e¢ cient. In the "good news" case, the degeneracy of
the best SSPPE is similar in shape to the results obtained by Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Sannikov
and Skrzypacz (2007a), although clearly distinct in the mechanics behind it. This issue will be discussed
in more detail below.
7 See also, Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007b) where they bound the set of equilibria when  ! 0 for Levy
processes by placing restrictions on how information from Brownian and Poisson components are used to
provide incentives in the most e¢ cient way.
8 See also, Fudenberg and Levine (2008) where they consider di¤erent ways of passing to the continuous
time limit, i.e. binomial and trinomial approximations of the Brownian paths, linking monitoring intensity
with event frequency, by taking the limit of the former.
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signal is the observed state of an ABM process, which can be inuenced by the actions of the
long-run player. The long-run player would like to sustain the equilibrium associated with
a particular action, in the case where the drift of the process decreases with , but she may
also deviate to get a larger expected short run payo¤, in which case the drift of the process
increase with . The results are driven by the assumption that the initial conditions on the
process are the same independently of the actions of the long-run player. When  becomes
small the distribution of the public signals cannot provide reliable information about the
long-run player actions, creating the degenerating e¤ect, which may also occur even before
the limit. However, they show that if a deviation by the long-run player increases the
uncertainty parameter; equilibria can be achieved that are arbitrary close to e¢ ciency. This
is so far the most positive limit result obtained with frequent monitoring under Brownian
uncertainty.
Before proceeding, it is important to understand what information we can obtain from
statistical inference for Brownian type processes9. While the variance parameter can be
consistently estimated from the path of the process (ys; s 2 (t; t+ "]), for a small but mea-
surable ", the same does not happen with the drift of the process. Even if players are able to
observe the full path of the process realized from time t to time t+, a relatively large  is
needed for the actions of the players to be statistically distinguishable. The rst observation
is on the basis of Fudenberg and Levines (2007) almost e¢ cient result. The second explains
why the set of equilibria payo¤s deteriorates when  decreases and equilibria above the
static Nash are not possible as reported in Fudenberg and Levine (2007), and Sannikov and
Skrzypacz (2007a).
The present paper models the public signal observed by the players at moments in time
t = ; 2; :::, in a di¤erent way. Since players focus on the observed public signal, the
monitoring technology is in that sense similar to Fudenberg and Levine (2007). However,
when each player privately selects her action, the initial condition on the process will reect
the aggregate of these individual decisions. Two di¤erent actions of player i have associated
di¤erent initial conditions that can be statistically distinguished from each other for high
monitoring frequencies. There is a measurable distance between an initial condition associ-
ated with mutual cooperation and an initial condition associated with a prole of actions
9 See Prakasa Rao (1999) for a formal treatment of the statistical methods for di¤usion processes.
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where a unilateral deviation has occurred. When switching from cooperation to defection,
player i causes a movement in the process similar to a jump. When away from the limit,
such jump might be hard to separate from the aggregate of innitesimal realizations, but in
the limit such movement is almost surely caused by deviating behaviour. This is even more
evident when the action space is discrete.
Even though they present di¤erent results for the same problem, it is important to stress
that the modelling proposed in this paper, the Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Sannikov
and Skrzypacz (2007a) are not competing approaches, but rather they complement each
other. The degeneracy e¤ect reported in the latter approaches seems suitable to model
situations where reliable information needs time to build-in, in such cases an early access to
this "not ready" information generates perverse e¤ects. These papers have in common the
fact that the informativeness of the public signals increases with the lack of monitoring. A
player that is actually cooperating needs some time for the associated output to be separated
in statistical terms from the situation from which she has deviated. Examples of situations
that t into such a framework are a judges verdict or an investment report. Asking a judge
to read her sentence ve minutes after the start of judgement might be premature. Probably
one week later she will be in better position to deliver a more qualied decision. The same
happens with the investment report.
However, in problems where the information contained in the public signals increases with
the monitoring intensity, the approach of the present paper is more appropriate; for example
when the variable that is the object of monitoring is the physical activity of a worker,
for which information is continuously available. When monitored with high frequency a
deviating worker will nd it hard to justify a low observation of the process. If such a
low value of the process is observed, it is very likely that it has been caused by deviating
behaviour. On the other hand, when the time interval between monitoring activities is large,
a low observation can be justied both as a result of nature as well as a result of deviating
behaviour. The monitor is then more likely to incur in either type I or type II errors10.
In problems of this type frequent monitoring may produce a disciplinary e¤ect among the
players11, but everything depends on what variable players are monitoring. In general terms,
10 We refer to a type I error as the event of punishing a non-deviator, and a type II error as the event of not
punishing a deviator.
11 The disciplinary e¤ect of monitoring seems to be easier to support. See, for example, the classical work
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the monitoring approach presented in this paper ts in situations where e¤ort is modelled
as an action that has a more physical meaning as opposed to an intellectual one attached
to it.
In this sense, the present paper lls a gap in the existing literature in frequent monitoring
in repeated games, by enlarging the spectrum of potential real life situations that can be
studied with this framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the repeated game model and the
public information producing process. Section III explains in detail the approach of this
paper, in particular the connection between the initial conditions of the process and the
associated distributions. Section IV computes the bounds on the set of SSPPE payo¤s and
characterizes the optimal decision rule for varying. Section V focuses on the limit case and
presents the main results of this paper. Section VI discusses extensions to the continuous
time case and to games with a continuous action space. Section VII concludes.
II. THE REPEATED GAME MODEL
To present the main arguments outlined in the previous section, we explore frequent
monitoring in a simple partnership game played between two long-run players. The history
of the game is the following. At moments in time t = 0;; 2; :::, two players can choose
from two di¤erent e¤ort levels ati = 1 or a
t
i = 0. In the former case, player i is providing
e¤ort, in the latter case she is shirking. More formally, let Ati = f0; 1g denote player
is2 N = f1; 2g non-empty and compact action space with generic element ati representing
an action, and denote At = At1  At2 as the set of action proles endowed with the product
topology of the individual action spaces, with generic element at = (at1; a
t
2) denoting a prole
of actions.
Independently of their private e¤ort decisions, players at moments in time t = ; 2; :::,
observe and divide equally between themselves the total output generated during these
intervals of time of length . Given a prole of actions at at time t, the total output and,
at same time, the publicly information observed at time t+12, is driven by the following
of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) for an early defense of this perspective.
12 There is also the possibility that in the end of each period of length , players observe the full path of the
process (ys; s 2 (t; t+]) realized from t to t+. This case provides more information to the monitor.
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ABM13,
yt+ = yt + 
Z t+
t
dZs; with Zt = 0 and t = 0;; 2; :::; (2.1)
where yt  2d (at1 + at2) is the initial condition of the process at a given time t, a function of
the unknown prole of actions.
All the uncertainty arises from the standard Brownian motion fZs; s  0g. Observe
that information about the evolution of the total output is produced continuously every
innitesimal time interval a new realization of the process is available. The monitoring
frequency  and the frequency of signals are di¤eren; in some sense our goal is to equate
the monitoring frequency to the signal frequency.
All the relevant information relevant about players actions is contained in the initial
condition of the process at each moment in time t = 0;; 2; :::. Since players cannot revise
their actions during the interval of length , the process (2.1) has no drift. In this way, we
also eliminate any trend in the process that is irrelevant for the study of the problem in our
setting14. Implicitly, we are imposing that the public information producing process satises
the martingale property,
E (yt+jyt;  0) = yt;
with respect to some ltration. As a consequence, the transition density of the process places
equal mass above and below the initial condition, i.e. above and below its mean15.
Player is2 f1; 2g realized payo¤ (ex-post) from the partnership is given by,
ri
 
ati; yt+
  yt+=2  (d+ c) ati;
where d > c > 0 and yt+ is the realized output from the partnership16, which is divided
It can be shown, that when compared with the case where only the state of the process is observed, a
lower threshold is always required to sustain a particular equilibrium and as a consequence it always has
larger associated payo¤s. Note, however, that in the limit both cases are equivalent.
13 The ABM assumption simplies the analyses and the proofs of many of the results which will be presented
later. However, all results are valid for the geometric Brownian motion and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
14 Using a public information producing process with drift leads to the same results. In that case, the
threshold would be some function preserving the distance to the initial condition. For example, for the
ABM process with drift, the threshold would be the function b +  (yt; t) t, where b is the threshold
associated with an ABM process without drift and  (yt; t) t is the drift of the process. Both approaches
lead to the same distribution of the public signals.
15 Examples of other processes with the proposed specications are  (yt; t) = 0 for the geometric Brownian
motion, and  (yt; t) =  (y0   yt) for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
16 We assume that public signal is not only an action dependent function but also represents the evolution
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equally between the players independently of the e¤ort that they have supplied. The second
term on the right-hand side (RHS) denotes the cost of providing e¤ort for player i in utility
terms. By the martingale property, the expected payo¤ (ex-ante) of player i 2 f1; 2g from
the partnership is then,
i
 
at
  E  ri  ati; yt+ jyt = d  at1 + at2  (d+ c) ati:
Under the expected utility hypothesis, this is the expression that is relevant for studying
our problem.
In summary, at each moment in time t = 0;; 2; :::, players repeatedly play the stage
game,
1 0
1 d  c; d  c  c; d
0 d; c 0; 0
Providing no e¤ort is a dominate strategy for both players. The minimax value of the game
coincides with the stage game Nash payo¤s and equals 0 for both players. This game has
the same structure as a prisonersdilemma, and can be treated as such.
I will focus on strongly symmetric public strategies, where after every public history17 the
same action is chosen by both players. A strategy is public if at any moment t it depends
only on the public histories and not on player is private history. Given a public history, a
prole of public strategies that induces a Nash equilibrium on the continuation game from
time t on, is called a perfect public equilibrium (PPE). Moreover, if the other player  i is
playing a public strategy, player is best reply can only be a public strategy.
Players discount the futures according to a common discount factor, assuming exponential
discounting   e r, where r is the discount rate.
Player is2 f1; 2g payo¤s in the -indexed innitely repeated game is the discounted
normalized sum of the stage-game expected payo¤s, (1  )
1P
t=0;;2;:::
ti (a
t), induced by
the prole of actions at for every t = 0;; 2; :::.
of the aggregate output of the partnership. Other formulations of the public signal could have also been
considered, provided that they would depend on both playersactions. It is also important that ri (:) does
not depend on a i explicitly.
17 A public history, a time t, is a sequence of realizations of the observed state of the process, denoted by
ht = (yt ; yt 2; :::; y0) 2 Y t with h0 = Y 0  ?. The sequence of player is private actions is player is
private history.
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III. THE INITIAL CONDITIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SIG-
NALS
As discussed in the introductory section, the proposed approach places distinct initial
conditions on the process, which depend on the unknown action prole simultaneously and
privately decided by the players in the beginning of each period of the game. Since this is a
critical issue, in this section we examine in more detail the monitoring technology employed
in this paper.
To keep the notation simple, from now on we will drop the t index, and simply denote with
a  index an end of period object, and without any index when it refers to the beginning
of the period.
Since the focus is on SSPPE, we are interested in sustaining the strongly symmetric prole
(1; 1) against potential unilateral deviations. The space of public signals is continuous;
players use a threshold decision rule18 to distinguish realizations suggesting cooperation
from realizations suggesting defection. The threshold value creates a partition of the signal
space; in signals suggesting cooperative behaviour fy > bg, which we call "good" signals,
and signals suggesting defective behaviour fy  bg, called "bad" signals.
In general, for a given initial condition y  2d (a1 + a2), the probability that the state of
the public process (2.1) appears below b in the end of the period of length  is
Pr (y  b) = 

b  2d (a1 + a2)

p


;
where  (:) is the standard zero mean and unit variance Gaussian distribution.
We assume that the type of uncertainty they are facing is common knowledge among the
players. In particular, they know the value of parameter 19. This way they can compute
the above probability and the impact of a deviation on the distribution of the public signals.
Depending on the unknown prole of actions that arise from each players private e¤ort
18 Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007a) show that a threshold decision rule is the best test to detect unilateral
deviations. Later, we will focus on the optimal threshold value for varying parameterizations of . For
now we contend with an arbitrary threshold value, denoted as b, and we will abstain from referring its
dependence on  as well as other parameters of the model.
19 The assumption that players know the variance of the process is not as strong as it might seem. According
to the discussion in the introductory section, since the focus is on the limit case and this is equivalent to
full path observation, if players do not know the value of this parameter they can estimate it consistently
in a very small but measurable time interval ".
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decision ai2N , we have di¤erent initial conditions for the public process. In the partnership
game there are four possible proles of actions: the strongly symmetric prole a  (1; 1),
the unilateral deviation proles a0  (0; 1)  (1; 0)20 and the Nash or punishment prole
aN  (0; 0). The latter prole is a Nash equilibrium, and for that reason it is trivially
self-enforcing. We will focus on the rst two possibilities:
i) The strongly symmetric prole a has a initial condition 4d and a probability of pun-
ishment denoted as
F (b;)  

b  4d

p


:
This is type I error probability; even though no player has deviated, punishment will be
exerted when a low realization of the process is observed.
ii) The unilateral deviation prole a0 has an initial condition 2d and a probability of
punishment denoted as
F 0 (b;)  

b  2d

p


:
Analogously a type II error is given by 1  F 0 (b;), see footnote 10 above.
Observe that the actions decided independently at the beginning of the period by each
of the players are clearly printed in the initial conditions of the process, as they should
be. At the end of the period of length , the prole of actions chosen by the players
appears disturbed by some noise. Lowering , we are decreasing the uncountable number of
innitesimal contributions to the noise, leading to a more likely observation of the process
around its initial condition. An observation of the process far away from the mutual e¤ort
initial condition is then a sign of a deviation.
If we want to generalize this methodology to other more complex environments, this
correspondence between actions taken and the associated expected public signal observed
in the end of the period always have to be present. More elaborated information structures
such as the pairwise full-rank condition of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) are not
required.
Active Coordination
20 Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) pairwise full-rank condition typically fails for strongly symmetric
equilibria. There is no loss in generality when placing no distinction between the proles (1; 0) and (0; 1),
and denoting them as a0. Also note that to keep the notation standard, until now, a has denoted a general
action prole. With a slight abuse of notation, a now denotes the strongly symmetric e¤ort prole.
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When the game is a repeated partnership, it is natural to assume that the process is reset
at the end of each period, after players have observed and split the realized output, starting
again in the point associated with the new action prole decided simultaneously by both
players. However, the same assumption does not t in some other contexts. For example in
the repeated Cournot game, it is not reasonable to assume that players can reset the process
every period, since it represents the market price. In this case, the new equilibrium actions
have to be adjusted to take into account the observed state of the process21. Although
di¤erent, these two possibilities can be studied within the same methodology. To illustrate
this point consider the following example.
In the Cournot duopoly game the public process observed at time  is the market price,
P = P + 
R 
0
dZt, where P = (  q1   q2). Suppose that at time 0 the game starts with
both players supplying the monopoly quantities, i.e. qi = =422. The expected market price
(and initial condition) is then P = =2 and players select some threshold value b < =2.
In period , let the realization of the process be P = P + z. If P  b, players play
their punishment actions, with respect to the observed state of the process. For simplicity,
consider the Nash punishment; where in the following period each player will supply qi =
(+ z) =3.
On the other hand, if P > b, the next period 50/50 monopoly quantities will be chosen
also taking into account the state of the process, hence, requiring each player to supply
the quantities qi = (+ z) =4 with a necessary adjustment in the decision rule, i.e.
b = b+ z.
We will call this type of coordinated behaviour between players in a dynamic setting
Active Coordination, since it requires players to adjust their equilibrium path actions taking
into account the observed state of the process. Players do not reset the value of the process,
but rather they reset the uncertainty.
21 The martingale condition guarantees that such a procedure does not change the properties of the distri-
bution of the public signals.
22 In the Cournot duopoly game under imperfect public information, it is never e¢ cient to produce exactly
the monopoly quantities, but rather an amount slightly larger (except in the limit). This issue and others
are discussed in more detail in section VIB. Take this example as an illustration.
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IV. THE BEST STRONGLY SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA
This section furnishes the reader with a set of general results that are independent of
the monitoring intensity, which will be particularly useful for the following section when
we focus on the limit case. It also presents a characterization of the optimal decision rule
associated with the value of the best SSPPE of the innitely repeated partnership game.
In some occasions, the results presented are standard in repeated games; a brief description
will be presented, su¢ cient to keep the exposition self-contained.
Since the game is symmetric there is no loss in generality when studying a single player
incentives, hence we remove players indexes.
Recall from the previous section that the equilibrium prole we want to sustain is a 
(1; 1). A prole where a single player deviates is denoted as a0, and the Nash prole denoted
as aN . These proles have associated with them the stage game payo¤s,    (a) = d  c,
0   (a0) = d and N    aN = 0, respectively. See the expected payo¤s table in section
II. The public information is produced continuously and is generated by the simple ABM
process given by (2.1), with initial conditions depending on the unknown action prole.
Since the public information process can virtually return any value in R, we can use
the Abreu, Pearce and Staccetti (1986, 1990) bang-bang result to compute the best SSPPE
payo¤.
Lemma 1 (Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007a Lemma 3)) In a strongly symmetric
equilibria each player solves the problem,
max
v(y)2[v;v]
(1  ) + 
Z 1
 1
v (y) f (y) dy
s.t. for all y 2 R,
(1  ) (0   )  
Z 1
 1
v (y) (f (y)  f 0 (y)) dy;
where v (:)  v denotes the continuation value of the game, and f (:) and f 0 (:) are the
Gaussian densities associated with the public process (2.1) for the initial conditions 4d and
2d respectively and common variance 2. When a solution to this problem exists, it takes
the form
v (y) =
8<: v if y > bv if y  b
for b 2 ( 1; 3d].
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Here v and v will denote respectively the upper and the lower bounds on the set of SSPPE
payo¤s23. The Lemma tell us that the continuation value v of the game is some non-trivial
combination between the expected value v when play starts with the observation of a good
signal and the expected value v when play starts with an observation of a bad signal. Such
continuation value must enforce the prole a.
Here punishments are not executed in terms of a deterministic number of time periods as
suggested by Porter (1983) and Green and Porter (1984) but rather in a probabilistic sense
as in Abreu, Pearce and Staccetti. In our partnership problem, as we shall see, since the
distribution of the public signals is not convex, optimality requires an innite punishment
length and both approaches do not di¤er. In some other problems, in particular when the
minmax value di¤ers from the Nash value, the di¤erences might be substantial.
Lemma 1 allows us to rewrite playersproblem in a more tractable way, and to use simple
dynamic programming methods to search for expressions for the values of v and v that are
exclusively represented as functions of the parameters of the model. The value of the best
SSPPE is then written,
v = (1  ) +  [(1  F (b;)) v + F (b;) v] : (4.1)
It can be interpreted as follows. While both players provide e¤ort, each receives the im-
mediate discounted normalized expected payo¤ associated with mutual e¤ort, as well as a
discounted expectation over the expected values associated with the two potential signals
that might be observed.
The value in expression (4.1) has to satisfy the usual set of constraints,
v  (1  )0 +  [(1  F 0 (b;)) v + F 0 (b;) v] ;
v  v  N ;
b 2 ( 1; 3d] :
The rst constraint is the enforceability condition of Lemma 1; we will frequently use the
terminology incentive compatibility (IC henceforth) instead. It has a simple interpretation:
23 Since later we will allow players to correlate their actions on some public signal we are calling v and v
extreme points of the set of SSPPE payo¤s. This set is the collection of all payo¤s that can be achieved
with strongly symmetric public strategies, i.e. when both players choose the same action after every public
history. See also the discussion after Proposition 2.
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the expected value of the game associated with mutual e¤ort has to be at least as good as
the expected value of the game associated with a potential unilateral deviation, even if this
deviation just last one period. The second constraint requires both v and v to be feasible
and individually rational. The third condition is technical and comes from Lemma 1. It
restricts b to the interval where @F 0 (b;) =@b  @F (b;) =@b, i.e. the likelihood ratio is
larger than or equal to one. An alert of deviation is more likely to occur when somebody
has in fact deviated. The likelihood di¤erence F 0 (b;)  F (b;) is non-negative and is an
increasing function of b in the interval ( 1; 3d]. In Appendix A we show that this condition
does not impose any particular restriction since it is always satised.
When any of these conditions fails, no equilibria either the innite repetition of the static
Nash equilibrium can be sustained, i.e. v = N . When this turns out to be the case, in
particular in the limit, we say that the set of SSPPE payo¤s degenerates24.
We can solve the system composed by expression (4.1) and the IC constraint (assuming
it holds with equality), for v and v, to obtain the solutions
v =    F (b;)
F 0 (b;)  F (b;) (
0   ) ; (4.2)
and
v = v   (1  )

0   
F 0 (b;)  F (b;) : (4.3)
Expression (4.2) and (4.3) characterize the value of the upper and lower bounds on a set
of SSPPE payo¤s respectively.
Appendix A shows that the constraint b 2 ( 1; 3d] is always satised. Additionally as
a necessary condition for optimality, we have imposed that the IC condition would have
to hold with equality. Now we are just left with the feasibility constraint to be concerned
about. The following result establishes conditions on the threshold b in order for the value
v to be optimal among all the SSPPE values that are feasible.
Proposition 2 In pure strategies and with public correlation, under (2.1) and given ,
any punishment strategy with associated expected value v 2 N ; v is feasible. Moreover,
the strategy prole that achieves the largest upper bound v on the set of SSPPE payo¤s
24 The statement is not exactly correct. It might happen that condition b 2 ( 1; 3d] is not satised and we
are still able to achieve payo¤s that satisfy all the other conditions. However in such a case the value b
has not been chosen e¢ ciently. The concept of e¢ cient threshold is dened in Appendix A.
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requires perpetual punishment the rst time the process is observed below b (). Where
b ()  b is called the optimal threshold and is the solution to v = N , i.e. b solves
F 0 (b;)
 
   N  F (b;)  0   N  (1  ) (0   ) = = 0: (4.4)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The result tells us that among all the feasible punishment schemes, perpetual punishment
is the optimal one. Expression (4.4) gives an implicit function to compute b.
For a given , when a solution b to (4.4) exists, the value in expression (4.2) returns the
largest SSPPE payo¤ v. The optimal threshold b is the lowest value of b that is feasible
and IC. It establishes the right balance between gains and losses associated with right and
wrong inference about playersactions.
Independently of , the largest strongly symmetric payo¤ is attained using the most
severe punishment available25, which happens because the ABM is a Gaussian process and
the distribution of the public signals is not convex in all of its domain26.
Notice that the two point set

N ; v
	
associated with (4.4) in Proposition 2 is self-
generating using only pure strategies, since the continuation values N and v are elements
of the set. However we have added a public correlated signal and we have called the set of
SSPPE payo¤s

N ; v

. When we consider the set [v; v] with v > N , a public correlated
signal is required in order for the set to be self-generating. The reason is that the continu-
ations associated with the value of the game that starts with cooperation, and the value of
the game that starts with punishment must be elements in the interval [v; v]. The important
point here is that such a generalization allows us to call the set of SSPPE an interval even
when v = N and also because the result in Proposition 5 of Section V will be shown to
hold not only under optimal behaviour but also for more general sets [v; v]  N ; v.
However, not explicitly mentioned in order to keep the notation simple, the solution b
depends on all the parameters in the model, i.e. d, c, r and . Note also that since the
values of F (:) and F 0 (:) are endogenously determined by b, expression (4.2) necessarily
depends on players impatience level.
25 Nonetheless, we will keep working with expression (4.2), which is more general and can harbour the
perpetual punishment case as a particular case.
26 For a discussion of this issue in the context of repeated games, see Porter (1983).
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By proposition 2, if a solution to (4.4) exists, it is an optimal threshold b. The following
result establishes that such a solution, indeed exists, and is unique and di¤erentiable on
some interval
 
0;

. The value  depends on all the parameters of the model, and denotes
the maximum length of time between observations of the process in the innitely repeated
partnership that can support some nontrivial equilibria.
Proposition 3 There is a  > 0 such that for all  2  0;, a solution b () to (4.4)
exists, is unique and di¤erentiable.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Outside the interval
 
0;

there is no value of b that satises (4.4), and shirk becomes
a dominate strategy for both players.
The Optimal Threshold - Numerical
Proposition 2 shows that the largest value of v is obtained using the most severe punish-
ment. Such punishment has associated with it an optimal decision rule whose existence is
guaranteed by Proposition (3). Now we will attempt to provide the intuition behind some
properties of the resulting decision rule.
Figure 1 shows the optimal threshold value as a function of , for the partnership game,
and for di¤erent parameterizations of  and r, when d = 3 and c = 1.
It is clear from the gure that independently of the values that  and r can take, in the
limit as ! 0, the value of b converges to 2d, the expected signal that would arise if there
was a deviation. Such a result is formally shown in Proposition 6 in Section V27.
Notice that the value  increases either when players get more patient or the public
signal becomes less noisy, see Figure 1.
The more impatient the players are (larger r) the tighter the monitoring28 must be in
order to create incentives for cooperative behaviour. This can be seen in Figure 1 where for
the same parameterizations as above, we increase r from 0:1 to 0:2.
27 It can also be shown that @b=@!  1 when ! 0 and @b=@!1 when !  , however such
results are not particularly relevant.
28 By "tighter monitoring" as opposed to "relaxed monitoring", I mean a higher threshold value. The larger
the threshold the more likely players are to detect deviations, but they are also more likely to commit
type I errors.
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FIG. 1: The optimal threshold as a function of .
When we consider the noise parameter of the public process , it is not always true
that large uncertainty leads to a lower threshold. For high levels of monitoring intensity
this would be so, but when the monitoring frequency is low a tighter threshold might be
required even if the uncertainty level is higher, since the incentives for deviation increase
with . This can be seen in Figure 1, for example when  = 6; for  around 2:3 we observe
that the associated threshold tight above the threshold associated with  = 3.
The convex shape of the threshold function in  2  0; is caused by two e¤ects that
operate in the same direction. They are the increasing informativeness of the public signal
when the monitoring activity intensies, and the expected immediate gains from deviating
behaviour that also decrease when  becomes small. For innitesimal , the public signal is
extremely informative and the expected immediate gains from deviation become negligible;
for that reason the optimal threshold approaches 2d. When the monitoring decreases in
intensity, the sum of innitesimal variations of the process is more likely to generate a
"bad signal". Wrong punishments in the equilibrium path become more likely, forcing
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the monitoring to relax, but in a decreasing way, because at the same time the expected
immediate gains from deviating behaviour are becoming more attractive. At a certain point,
when it reaches its minimum value, the optimal threshold value starts increasing with ,
creating the convex shape. This happens because the expected gains from deviation become
increasingly important and the monitoring has to become tighter in order to keep players
with incentives. Finally, for large values of   , there is no threshold value that can
sustain mutual e¤ort; shirk is a dominant strategy for both players.
V. MONITORING FREQUENCY AND LIMIT EFFICIENCY
In this section we look at the value v of the upper bound on the set of SSPPE of the
partnership game when the monitoring reaches its highest intensity, i.e. when  ! 0. We
will see that when such a value is feasible then is also e¢ cient in the limit.
We will also look at the limit value of b and we will show that under Brownian uncer-
tainty, monitoring intensity always has a positive e¤ect on the payo¤s. These results are
independent of how much players discount the future and of the uncertainty level.
A. Monotonicity of the Best SSPPE Payo¤
We start to present a result that establishes monotonicity between the value of the optimal
upper bound on the set of SSPPE payo¤ and monitoring intensity. The result holds for any
monitoring intensity  2  0;.
Proposition 4 For all  2  0; and b 2 ( 1; 3d], the best SSPPE payo¤s v increase
monotonically with the monitoring intensity, i.e. with a decrease in .
Proof. See Appendix C.
The monotonicity of the best SSPPE payo¤ to the monitoring intensity, in our setting,
suggests that more monitoring always improves the payo¤s. More monitoring is then pre-
ferred to less monitoring. The result is a consequence of the increased precision of the public
signal when  becomes small. Kandori (1992) shows a similar result, where an exogenous
improvement of the public signals causes a necessarily expansion on the set of PPE.
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B. Limit E¢ ciency of the SSPPE Payo¤s
We now turn our attention to the limit case, i.e. when ! 0. Observe that a threshold
that is slightly larger (more tight) than b still satises the feasibility conditions but at the
expense of a lower SSPPE payo¤, while a lower value (more relaxed) than b cannot satisfy
the feasibility constraint. The threshold b gives us exactly the point that maximizes v
according to Proposition 2. As we will see, limit e¢ ciency does not require an optimal value
for b, as in the limit, the same results hold with a larger threshold inside some region.
To obtain an e¢ cient result in the limit we must see F (b;)! 0 when! 0, suggesting
that in the limit, the probability of a type I error converges to 0. It conrms the comments
previously made, that under Brownian uncertainty when the monitoring intensity is taken
to the limit, the public signals become almost perfectly informative of playersactions. On
the other hand, in the case of a deviation, the probability of detection F 0 (b;) must not
vanish in the limit, in order for an e¢ cient result to be sustainable. We should not concern
ourselves too much with the exact limit value of this probability since it depends on the exact
form of b () which is unknown to us. As well will see, these simple conditions are su¢ cient
to keep players with incentives to provide e¤ort in the limit. Fudenberg and Levine (2007)
discuss the necessity of similar conditions for the existence of an e¢ cient limit equilibrium.
Under the optimal punishment scheme of the previous section, we had the relation v 
v = N for some  2  0;, with  depending on the parameters of the model, and
v = v = N in some interval

;1, i.e. the innite repetition of the static Nash payo¤.
These are in accordance with Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 of Section IV.We can, however,
set a lower bound on the set of SSPPE payo¤s, such that v > N . The punishment stage is
not absorbing anymore; returning to the cooperative path is then possible. Such relaxation
on the expected value (a larger v) of a game that starts with an observation of a bad
signal impacts negatively on the value of the upper bound v, since it associates a lower
continuation value. Consequently, the following relations must hold v  v  v  N = v
and b  b  3d.
We will now present the main result of the paper. The idea is to take a feasible interval
[v; v]  N ; v and show that the associated best SSPPE payo¤ is e¢ cient in the limit.
Intuitively, if v !  and since v  v, then v must converge to  as well.
Proposition 5 When the public signal follows (2.1) with distinct initial conditions for dif-
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ferent e¤ort proles, the upper bound on the set of SSPPE payo¤s of the innitely repeated
partnership game v !  as ! 0 providing that r > 0 and  <1, for any b 2 [b; 3d].
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 5 tell us that when the initial conditions of the process reect di¤erent e¤ort
proles and the public signals are Brownian and continuously available, we can achieve
e¢ cient SSPPE payo¤ by monitoring the process at the highest frequencies.
There is a large set of thresholds that make the result possible in the limit, which was
shown for any b 2 [b; 3d]. Since the set of feasible and admissible decision rules is just a
subset [b; b] of [b; 3d], we can restrict our result to this subset, see Appendix A.
The result is independently of how players discount the future and independently of the
magnitude of the noise parameter in the process. The lack of importance of the players
patience in the limit is easy to reconcile. Even if players have a large discount rate, in the
limit  is a continuous function and potential gains from deviating behaviour are negligible.
The independence from  is more surprising. No matter how large this parameter is, any
realization of the process is still multiplied by
p
, which goes to zero with , explaining
its limit irrelevance.
It is important to understand that even though v ! , punishment it still present. What
is happening is that once in the punishment state the probability of returning to the reward
state converges to one, implying that the continuation payo¤ associated with v converges to
the value v, becoming the dominant component. Punishments are expected to last no longer
than a few numbers of instantaneous periods, su¢ cient to keep players with incentives.
Figure 2 shows how the value of the best SSPPE payo¤ v associated with the thresholds
of Figure 1 converge to the most e¢ cient outcome  = 2, for varying monitoring intensities.
Figure 2 clearly shows the strict monotonic improvement in the best SSPPE payo¤s towards
e¢ ciency as the monitoring increases, in parallel with the statement of Proposition 4 and
Proposition 5.
The increased informativeness of the public signals for high levels of monitoring intensity
is the key aspect. It is due to the measurable distance between di¤erent initial conditions of
the process29. Such a distance in a process of innitesimal variation plays a crucial role and
makes destruction of value along the equilibrium path converging to zero with . Another
29 In the context of the partnership game, by measurable distance, we are referring to 2d = j2d  4dj.
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FIG. 2: The best strongly symmetric payo¤ as a function of .
important e¤ect that occurs for small  is the decrease in the expected immediate gains
from a deviation. At the end of Section IV above, these two e¤ects were discussed in some
detail.
Wrong inference about players equilibrium actions tends to vanish in the limit. Relevant
uncertainty arises only if players cannot observe the public process during some measurable
time interval. Then the accumulated sum of innitesimal normal events may be misleading,
which is even more likely the larger the time interval is, during which the process was left
unattended.
The mechanics of the repeated games plays a role in the result. That is, actions are
decided by players at the beginning of each period, at the end of the period the state of the
process is observed, uncertainty is reset30, new actions are taken for the following period
and so on. Under Brownian uncertainty, when we shrink the time interval of this cyclical
30 Uncertainty reset is equivalent to saying that either the value of the process is reset or players actively
coordinate. See the discussion on active coordination in Section III.
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process to the limit, what Fudenberg and Levine (2007) call "fast play", we get signals that
are "almost" perfectly informative of players actions. Almost in the sense that we still have
some innitesimal variation and also because we are still not able to determine the identity
of the deviator31. In Section VIA we discuss in more detail the meaning of the terminology
"almost" perfect monitoring.
We now present a last result, concerning the limit value of the optimal threshold b.
Corollary 6 When  ! 0 the optimal threshold b () converges to 2d, i.e. the expected
signal associated with the deviation with less impact on the distribution of the public signals.
Proof. See Appendix C.
For our particular game, the result simply states that b ! 2d in the limit. The result is,
however, more general; b must converge to the expected signal associated with the deviation
with less impact on the distribution of the public signals. This is true even if the game has
a continuous action space.
The focus here is on the limit of a sequence of discrete time games; however, the result
also suggests that the continuous time analogue to b should be 2d. We will discuss these
issues in more detail in Section VIA.
A few comments before complete this section. As mentioned before, the true functional
form of b is unknown, but clearly must depend on all the parameters of the model. It
is however nontrivial to verify the rate at which b converges to 2d. A wide number of
numerical simulations suggest that this convergence must occur at a rate lower than or
equal to
p
. Suppose that the optimal threshold function has the following structure:
b () = 2d   k (:) where k (:) is some function of all the parameters in the model that
converges to some bounded value and  > 0. While choosing   1=2 we can show that
e¢ cient and feasible results hold in the limit. On the other hand, when choosing a smaller 
than 1=2 we can bound b from below in some interval, violating, however feasibility. These
results suggest that b ! 2d at a rate of 0:499999(9). We will not develop this idea further,
since it is not required for any of the results. Nonetheless, the remark is left here.
31 Information about the identity of the deviator is on the basis of strong folk theorems under perfect
monitoring, see for example Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), as well as Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
(1994) for a folk theorem under imperfect public monitoring.
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The results presented in this paper also hold if we consider other well known Gaussian
processes of innitesimal variation, as for example, the geometric Brownian motion or the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Finally, as discussed in section III, without any extra conditions
on the information structure, these results can be generalized to others settings with a nite
number of players and many actions.
VI. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS - SOME COMMENTS
In this section we briey discuss two important extensions associated with the method-
ology presented in this paper. The rst, is how the results from a continuous time analogue
partnership game would di¤er from the discrete time version. Another important extension
would be to see how the approach of the present paper would perform if players have a con-
tinuum of actions available. This is important since the methodology exploits the jumping
e¤ect caused by a discrete deviation.
A. The Continuous Time
In this paper the emphasis has been placed on the limit of a discrete time repeated game.
It is also possible to employ the methods of this paper directly in continuous time.
It is important to interpret the limit of the time interval  as an approximation or an
abstraction for what would be an innitesimal time transition. In this way, the tails of the
distribution would not vanish. The limit degeneracy e¤ect observed on the distribution of
the public signals (see the proof of Proposition 5) would not occur directly in continuous
time.
Brownian paths are continuous but not di¤erentiable. The lack of smoothness of the paths
allows us to infer the existence of innitesimal variation. It is not clear that the limit of a
sequence of discrete time games as presented in this paper and the analogous model directly
in continuous times would exactly agree32. However, they should not di¤er signicantly.
32 There are some reasons for this: in particular Itos integral is dened in mean square sense and Brownian
motion is a construction based on innitesimal approximations. Because of that, it is di¢ cult to trans-
late the meaning of innitesimal transition to discrete time. The distribution associated with a single
innitesimal transition is then not well dened, degenerating in the limit.
24
The approach was based on building a sequence of thresholds for each monitoring fre-
quency that was shown to converge to the point 2d. When we take the limit of a discrete
time game, the rate of convergence to the limit point plays a role and we have to take it
into consideration. Directly in continuous time we do not have such a problem. This paper
suggests that the optimal threshold in continuous time is a value in the low neighbourhood
of 2d.
In the partnership game, if the equilibrium expected signal is 4d in continuous time,
the probability that in an instantaneous transition would touch the threshold 2d, does not
vanish, although it is a very unlikely event. Note, however, that in an innitely repeated
game played in continuous time, these events of almost zero probability are likely to happen
innitely often. Their destruction of value in the game is negligible however. The reason is
because the expected number of innitesimal periods of punishment needed to sustain the
equilibrium path will have zero measure. Thus we have an uncountable number of moments
where the path of the game is in the static Nash, but with total measure zero. In an intuitive
way, we can say that the path of the game is always in the cooperative equilibrium, with an
expected equilibrium payo¤ of , except for an uncountable number of periods with total
measure zero.
This discussion explains in some way the use of the terminology "almost" perfect infor-
mation to describe the limit situation.
B. A Game with a Continuous Action Space
When the action space is discrete in the limit, deviations from the equilibrium path are
equivalent to jumps in the process. Since Brownian paths are continuous but not smooth,
such defective behaviour is almost surely detected. In this section we briey discuss the
innitely repeated Cournot game. This game is of interest since it has a continuum of
actions available for each player and so deviations can be innitesimal.
We apply the bang-bang result for the strongly symmetric equilibrium in the spirit of
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986 and 1990)33.
In brief, the stage game expected payo¤s (ex-ante) are given by i (q1; q2) = qiP (Q) where
33 I thank Andrzej Skrzypacz for providing me with the material needed to compute and understand the
mechanics of the best SSPPE payo¤s in the Cournot game.
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FIG. 3: The best strongly symmetric equilibrium in the Cournot game.
P (Q) is the inverse demand function and Q = q1+q2 is the aggregate supply. Firms, always
have the possibility of staying out of the market and producing nothing. For simplicity and
without loss generality, production costs are zero and rms face no capacity constraints, i.e.
qi 2 [0;1).
The stage game best strongly symmetric equilibrium is achieved when each rm supplies
half of the monopoly quantity. Denote this quantity as qMi .
The two rms decide their supply quantities simultaneously and independently at mo-
ments in time t = 0;; 2::: and observe the market price (the public signal) at times
t = ; 2:::. The public signal is given by (2.1)34. Where now yt+ is the observed market
price at a given moment in time t + , and yt  P (Qt) is the inverse demand and the
initial condition of the process, it reects the individual private supply decisions taken by
each player at the beginning of the period t.
34 The observed state of the ABM price process may present a negative value. This undesirable feature of
the model is irrelevant for the issue we wish to study and there is no loss in generality when considering
such a process. A geometric Brownian motion process would be more adequate, but it also generates
other technical problems.
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For the case where P (Q) = 1   q1   q2 and  = r = 0:1, Figure 3 shows the value
of the best SSPPE for varying . In particular when  becomes small the best SSPPE
payo¤ converges to the value 1=8, the perfect monitoring 50/50 monopoly split payo¤. The
numerical approximation suggests that the same e¢ cient limit result, shown for the nite
action space case (Proposition 5) also holds in the continuous action case. A monotonic
improvement in the payo¤s is clear when  becomes small, similar to the statement of
Proposition 4.
It is also interesting to contrast the evolution of the optimal threshold against the expected
signal of the process P (Q) for varying . In Figure 4 can be seen that as  gets small,
the threshold value becomes tighter, in a similar fashion to the discrete actions case. In
the limit converging to the expected signal associated with the most collusive equilibrium
P
 
QM

= 1=2, as can be seen in Figure 4, reecting the decreasing uncertainty when! 0.
This result is just an extension of Corollary 6 for the continuous action space case. In the
limit the optimal threshold b () must converge to the expected signal associated with the
deviation with less impact on the distribution of the public signals. In the continuous action
case, such a deviation is an innitesimal deviation.
27
The discussion suggests that all the results presented in Section V also hold when we
consider games with a continuous action space. This is the main point highlighted by this
section.
VII. FINAL COMMENTS
In the simple setting of a repeated partnership game, this paper shows that e¢ cient
SSPPE payo¤s can be achieved in the limit when the public signal observed by the players
is the state of an ABM and the initial conditions associated with di¤erent e¤ort proles are
distinct.
Another conclusion of this paper is that payo¤s improve monotonically with monitoring
intensity.
Under Brownian uncertainty a degeneracy of the equilibrium in the limit or the opposed
e¢ cient scenario as shown here, depends crucially on the modelling adopted. Whereas the
former approach tends to t better in problems where the precision of the signals increases
with the time interval between observation of the process, as shown in the work of Fudenberg
and Levine (2007) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007a), the present approach is more ap-
propriate in situations where the informativeness of the signals improve with the monitoring
intensity.
Reality evolves continuously, however, in economics, and contrary to other sciences, it is
hard to think of situations where information is continuously available. An example could
be the listed price of very liquid stocks and certain commodities that are available at high
frequencies, but not continuously. Nevertheless, if such a possibility were available the most
e¢ cient outcomes would be achieved by continuously monitoring the state of process.
The reason why a continuous monitoring of the available information is not seen in real
world economic problems is because it is often extremely costly and does not compensate
the potential benets. In other situations the nature of the problem might recommend
monitoring at lower frequencies as suggested in the previously mentioned contributions.
Quoting Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 780), "If detecting such behavior were costless,
neither party would have an incentive to shirk, because neither could impose the cost of his
shirking on the other."
In practical applications when a partner continuously monitors the other, she probably
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cannot devote her time to other activities, such as providing e¤ort to the partnership. In
practice what we observe are agents monitoring at discrete moments in time. In many
occasions these monitoring events might be random, in the sense that an agent does not
know the exact moment in time when the monitor is going to observe the public signal.
Osório-Costa (2008) studies repeated games problems of this kind.
Even though the economic reality apparently nds no place for continuous monitoring,
it is important to stress the importance of the results presented here. Although its focus
was in the limit, this paper connects monitoring and actions frequency with their associated
payo¤s and decision rules. Repeated games theory can now mix actions frequency and
players patience, creating a wide spectrum of potential applications and developments for
the theory itself. While the impatience level of the players has typically been presented as
an exogenous element in the repeated games theory, monitoring frequency has an enormous
appeal to be endogenously determined by the problem at hand. This allows repeated games
theory in discrete time to study problems in a richer fashion.
APPENDIX A: EFFICIENT DECISION RULES AND THE SMALLEST SET
OF SSPPE.
Lemma 1 has constrained b to be in ( 1; 3d]. In what follows we will show that such a
constraint is always satised when the decision rule is admissible. Now, we dene what is
meant by an admissible threshold in our setting, which is similar to the meaning given in
decision theory.
Denition 7 Given a lower bound v on the set of SSPPE payo¤s, we say that a threshold
value b is admissible when it has associated with it the largest feasible upper bound v.
The function v is strictly concave in b, taking the maximum value v   for some
b 2 ( 1; 3d]. For that reason, the upper bound v might not be unique. For example, for
the same v 2  N ; v, we might be able to obtain two di¤erent upper bounds v1 and v2
with v1  v2 and associated thresholds b1  b2 respectively. In this case, it is not admissible
to choose an decision rule other than the one associated with the largest upper bound, i.e.
b1 dominates b2.
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Proposition 8 Given a  2  0;, the set of feasible and admissible thresholds for the
partnership game is the interval [b; b]  ( 1; 3d], where
b =

argmax
b2R
v s.t. v  N

;
and b is given by (4.4).
Given a  2  0;, a threshold b is guaranteed to be admissible if it satises @v=@b  0
and is said to be feasible if satises v  N .
When a decision rule belongs to the interval ( 1; 3d] the condition on b of Lemma 1 is
necessarily satised. Moreover, associated with each bound b and b with b  b on the
set of SSPPE payo¤s we have respectively, the smallest [v; v] and the largest [v
; v] sets
of SSPPE payo¤s.
Proof. Note that v  N for all  2  0;. Then to nd b we just need to look at the
derivative of v. The @v=@b  0 is equivalent to
1  

 F
0 (b;)Fb (b;)  F (b;)F 0b (b;)
F 0b (b;)  Fb (b;)
; (A1)
where F 0b (b;) and Fb (b;) denote respectively the partial derivatives of F
0 (b;) and
F (b;) with respect to b. The LHS does not depend on b. Suppose that the RHS is
monotonic for b 2 ( 1; 3d]. When b !  1 the ratio on the RHS converges to 0, while
if b ! 3d the ratio on the RHS converges to 1. So a value b must exist above which
the preceding inequality is reversed. So @v=@b  0 for b 2 ( 1; b] and @v=@b < 0 for
b 2 (b; 3d]. Then, by monotonicity, v is strictly concave, reaching the maximum value v
when b = b  3d.
Since @v=@b  0 for b 2 ( 1; b], following the same arguments for the optimality of v
as in Proposition 2, we lower the value of v until v = N by decreasing b as well. Implying
that b  b, and we must also have @v=@b > 0 at b = b. In summary we have v  v
for b 2 ( 1; b]  ( 1; 3d] and v  v = N for b 2 [b; 3d]  ( 1; 3d]. Putting
all of this together we obtain that an feasible and admissible threshold b must belong to
( 1; b] \ [b; 3d] = [b; b].
Note that the optimal decision rule b of Proposition 2 is a boundary value for the set of
feasible and admissible decision rules.
Finally, it could have also been shown that: b ! 3d when  ! 0, that b is a strictly
convex function in  and that b exists, and is unique and di¤erentiable inside the interval
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 
0;

.
APPENDIX B:
Proof of Proposition 2. The best strongly symmetric equilibria is obtained by the value
b that maximizes (4.2) subject to be feasible, i.e.
N  v = v   (1  )

0   
F 0 (b;)  F (b;)  v.
The equality establishes IC and the rst and second inequalities establish feasibility.
The payo¤we want to maximize v, increases monotonically when b decreases, i.e. @v=@b <
0 for any b 2 R since
F (b;)F 0b (b;)  F 0 (b;)Fb (b;) < 0;
for the Gaussian distribution. Where F 0b (b;) and Fb (b;) denote respectively the partial
derivatives of F 0 (b;) and F (b;) with respect to b. On the other hand, @v=@b  0
only for b 2 ( 1; b]  ( 1; 3d], where b is the threshold value that solves (A1) with
equality. See Proposition 8 and the respective proof in Appendix A. Then, clearly for
b 2 ( 1; b]  ( 1; 3d] the derivatives of v and v have opposite signs.
The maximum v is given by the lowest value of b that makes IC hold with equality and
pushing the value of v to the lower boundary of the feasible set, i.e. to N . Then, the
optimal threshold value b must satisfy,

 
aN

= v = v   (1  )

0   
F 0 (b;)  F (b;) : (B1)
Note that while v  maxb2R v  v = N we must have b  b, otherwise the set of
SSPPE equilibria degenerates. See the proof of Proposition 8 in Appendix A for a more
precise meaning of v.
Plug equality (B1) into expression (4.2) and rearrange it, to obtain, after some manipu-
lations
v =
(1  ) + F (b;)N
1   + F (b;) ;
which is the payo¤ associated with perpetual punishment. Plug this payo¤ back into the
binding IC constraint (B1), which after some rearrangement gives expression (4.4).
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Proof of Proposition 3. We extend the usual local implicit function theorem to hold in
some convex interval
 
0;

. For now take as given the existence of an upper bound  on
the interval
 
0;

. Denote the LHS of equality (4.4) by I (b;), which I rewrite here,
I (b;)  F 0     N  F  0   N  (1  ) (0   ) =: (B2)
Where, to save on notation, we have denoted as F  F (b;) and F 0  F 0 (b;), and
the partial derivatives with respect to b will be denoted respectively as Fb  @F (b;) =@b
and F 0b  @F 0 (b;) =@b. Since F , F 0 and  are continuous and di¤erentiable w.r.t. to its
own variables  2  0; and b 2 ( 1; 3d], so thus the mapping I (b;) is continuous and
di¤erentiable.
To simplify assume that the point (i) of Sandbergs (1981, p. 146) global implicit function
theorem holds, that is, for some 0 2
 
0;

there is exactly one b0 2 ( 1; 3d] such that
I (b0;0) = 0. Now we need to verify that I (b;) is locally solvable in the neighborhood of
the point (b0;0) and then by invoking continuity of b (), Sandbergs theorem must holds
for all  2  0;. The condition for local solvability is @I (b0;0) =@b 6= 0 implying that
I (b0;0) = 0. Since @v=@b > 0 for b0 2 ( 1; b)  ( 1; 3d], where b is the threshold
value that solves (A1) with equality. (See Proposition 8 and the respective proof in Appendix
A) Then I (b0;0) = 0 only when @I (b0;0) =@b > 0, or equivalently
   N
0   N >
Fb
F 0b
= e
4b0d 12d2
20
2 :
Since 0 > , the ratio on the LHS is constant, with a value strictly larger than zero but less
than one. For any b0 2 ( 1; b), Fb=F 0b ! 0 when 0 ! 0 which is the lowest value it can
take. When 0 !1 we have Fb=F 0b ! 1, the largest value it can take for 0 > 0. The ratio
Fb=F
0
b is clearly continuous, then exist always some nonempty interval of the form
 
0;

where the above inequality hold, where  is the lowest value in the pair (b0;0) such that
the above inequality stops to hold. Then for each point inside the interval
 
0;

there is a
unique continuous di¤erentiable function b () on an open ball around (b0;0) that locally
satises I (b;) = 0.
Now apply Sandbergs implicit function theorem; by continuity of b (), for each S 2 A
there is a T 2 B, where A and B are families of compact subsets of  0; and ( 1; 3d) re-
spectively, b (S) is compact as well and belongs to T . Then, there is a unique and continuous
function b () such that I (b;) = 0 for all  2  0;.
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Intuitively, depending on the parameters of the model  might be larger or smaller. The
threshold b () adjusts to keep (B2) holding with equality for a given . For  2 ;1
there is no b () that makes (B2) hold, in this case @I (b;) =@b = 0. While  2  0;
we can nd b () that makes (B2) hold.
APPENDIX C:
Proof of Proposition 4. Start by dening v () = max
b
v (b;) subject to (4.4), i.e.
I (b;) = 0 and write the Lagrangian L (b;) = v (b;) I (b;). By Proposition (3) the
solution b () is a continuous and di¤erentiable function of ; assume the same holds for
the Lagrangian multiplier . Then by the envelope theorem for constrained maximization
problems we can write @v () =@ = @L (b;) =@. Our goal is then to show that
@v ()
@
=
@v (b;)
@
  @I (b
;)
@
< 0 (C1)
where  is obtained from solving @L (b;) =@b = 0. Expression (C1) has the following three
components, which we develop to
@v (b;)
@
=  F
0F   FF 0
(F 0   F )2 (
0   ) ;
@I (b;)
@
= F 0
 
   N  F  0   N  r

(0   ) ;
and  =  (F
0Fb   FF 0b) (0   ) = (F 0   F )2
F 0b (   N)  Fb (0   N)
:
Where, to save on notation, we have denoted F  F (b;), F 0  F 0 (b;), F 
@F (b;) =@, F 0  @F 0 (b;) =@, Fb  @F (b;) =@b and F 0b  @F 0 (b;) =@b when
evaluated at b = b. Replacing these expressions in (C1), and after some algebra we obtain

F 0
 
   N  F  0   N (F 0bF   FbF 0) >  r (0   ) (F 0Fb   FF 0b) ;
using the expression (4.4), we can simplify further to get
(1  ) (F 0bF   FbF 0) >  r (F 0Fb   FF 0b) :
Notice that F =   (b 4d)2 Fb and F 0 =   (b
 2d)
2
F 0b, then we are left with
(1  )FbF 0bd= >  r (F 0Fb   FF 0b) :
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The LHS is clearly always positive. Since for any  > 0 we have F 0Fb   FF 0b > 0 for the
Gaussian distribution, the RHS is always negative.
Proof of Proposition 5. Our goal is to show that it is possible to obtain lim
!0
v = 
without violating the feasibility constraint. Denote b0  lim
!0
b () and focus on the values
of b0 2 ( 1; 3d]. We will look at limit values of b 2 ( 1; 3d] as required by Lemma (1).
It insures that we cover all the relevant limit cases, including some potentially not feasible
and inadmissible values of b, see Appendix A. Then, we obtained
F 0 (b;)!
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
0
0
 (:)
1
1
b0 2 ( 1; 2d)
b ()! 2d slower than p
b ()! 2d at p rate
b ()! 2d faster than p
b0 2 (2d;1)
;
and F (b;)! 0 when b 2 ( 1; 4d). Notice that when b ()! 2d we observe di¤erent limit
values for F 0 (b;) depending on the rate of convergence. Note also that when b () ! 2d
at
p
 rate F 0 (b;) !  (:), where the value of 0 <  (:) < 1 is left unspecied (this is
without loss in generality), it depends on the true functional form of b which is unknown
for us. In the limit we have a degeneracy on the distribution of the public signals; it can only
take one of three possible values, 0;  (:) and 1 (keep in mind that taking the limit  ! 0
is just an abstraction for an innitesimal transition).
Since the IC condition has been imposed and b 2 ( 1; 3d], we just need to verify
when feasibility condition v  v  N holds in the limit. Consider the following relevant
possibilities about the limit value of b.
i) b0 2 ( 1; 2d), we have F 0 (b;)  F (b;)! 0 implying that v !  1, which is not
feasible in the limit.
ii) b0 = 2d with b () ! 2d slower than
p
. In this case suppose b () = 2d  k (:)
with 0 <  < 1=2. We have F 0 (b;) ! 0 implying that v !  1, which is not feasible in
the limit.
iii) b0 = 2d with b () ! 2d at least at the
p
 rate. Consider the extreme case
b () = 2d pk (:)  b for all  2  0;. Then F 0 (b;) =  ( k (:) =) > 0, implying
that v ! v and v ! , which is feasible and approaches e¢ ciency in the limit.
iv) b0 2 (2d; 3d], we also obtain feasibility and convergence to the e¢ cient outcome in the
limit, i.e. v ! v and v ! .
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In both cases iii) and iv) we observe v and v converging to , but with v > v for all
innitesimal . To see this observe that
lim
!0
(v   v) = lim
!0
(1  )

0   
F 0(b;)  F (b;) > 0;
which is equivalent to looking at lim
!0
(1  ) (0   ) > 0. Di¤erentiating with respect to
, even though both v and v converge to , we obtain that if r > 0 we must have v < v for
small innitesimal . The irrelevance of  is always present in the proof.
Proof of Corollary 6. We know that the lower the value of b the larger the value of v,
since @v=@b < 0 is always true for the Gaussian distribution, see Section IV. Our problem
is then to nd the lowest feasible value of b that maximizes v. Using the results obtained in
the proof of Proposition 5, the lowest value of b such that F 0 (b;)!  (:) > 0 and at same
time F (b;) ! 0, is the value to which b must converge in the limit. So lim
!0
b () = 2d
is the lowest value which is feasible, and which achieves e¢ ciency. Other limit values either
are not lower or do not satisfy the feasibility constraint.
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